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F A C U L T Y

V I E W S

Chrysler’s Bankruptcy: Money
Laundering on a Grand Scale
Editor’s Note: “President Obama forced Chrysler into federal bankruptcy protection on Thursday so it could pursue a lifesaving alliance
with the Italian automaker Fiat, in yet another extraordinary intervention into private industry by the federal government.” That was the
assessment by The New York Times when the news broke in April.
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We knew some of our faculty would have strong opinions about the way the bankruptcy was handled. We weren’t disappointed. In the
next two articles, read J.J. White’s opinion about the Obama administration’s “clever but legal manipulation of the bankruptcy system.”
Then read John Pottow’s ruminations, see where he parts from his colleague, and learn his answer to what he calls the “big picture
question.” On which side of the divide did this fall: a government nationalization of heavy-handed policy guiding, or a reluctant
intervention of capital by the ultimate lender of last resort?

By James J. White, ’62

T

he bankruptcy of two of America’s prominent industrial
companies, Chrysler and General Motors, will be remembered
as a curious footnote in the financial crisis of 2008 and 2009.
Both companies left bankruptcy through the side door via a
“Section 363” sale, not through a plan of reorganization confirmed
by the vote of the creditors. Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code
was designed to allow a company in Chapter 11 to sell off
unneeded assets such as outmoded factories, unused real estate,
or other assets that would not contribute to the business that was
to emerge from Chapter 11 by the adoption of a Chapter 11 plan.
Since the 1980s, debtors have used Section 363 to turn the
Chapter 11 process on its head. In many Chapter 11 cases of public
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companies, the debtor in possession has sold the live part of the
business through 363 and has left the dead assets for later
liquidation. In these transactions, the debtor in possession
typically sells to a buyer who purchases the live business out of
the estate for cash. Despite controversy over its wisdom and
legality, the 363 sale of the living part of a business in Chapter 11
has now become a well-recognized and widely practiced method
of conducting the reorganization of a failing company.
Both academics and practicing lawyers have questioned this use
of Section 363. The principal criticism is that this use deprives the
creditors of the protection that is built into the process of proposing
and approving a plan of reorganization. It is possible but difficult to
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gain a court’s approval of a plan over the negative vote of a class
of creditors. In a 363 sale there is no vote, and creditors fear that
the debtor in possession will team up with a subset of the creditor
group and propose a sale that disadvantages the other creditors.
Indeed the principal limitations on such “cramdowns” over
creditors’ negative votes arose out of just such practices by
coalitions of shareholders and subsets of creditors in 19th century
reorganization practice. Set against these complaints is the
argument that the speed of 363 sales saves money and by the
claim that a properly conducted 363 sale
will bring as much as, or more than, the
value that would have been realized in a
fully negotiated and confirmed plan. UCLA
Professor Lynn LoPucki, ’67, and I have
debated the latter point in the Michigan
Law Review.
But I bore you. Chrysler presents political
issues far more interesting and relevant
than any claim about the proper reading
of the bankruptcy code. Even under the
new thinking on Section 363 sales, the
Chrysler sale was deviant. In Chrysler, the
nominal buyer, Fiat, put up no money.
Rather the federal government put the $2
billion into Chrysler so that it could pay off
the secured creditors at 28 cents on the
dollar. By removing $7 billion of secured
debt from Chrysler’s balance sheet, the
administration greatly increased the value
of the New Chrysler’s unsecured promise
to pay $4 billion to the UAW Voluntary
Employee Beneficiary Association, or
VEBA. In effect, the payment of $2 billion
to liquidate the superior secured debt
made it possible to move $4 billion from
New Chrysler to the UAW for its
unsecured claim.

political considerations. He notes that a proposal by Austan
Goolsbee, a member of President Obama’s Council of Economic
Advisers, to let Chrysler die (and so to let GM prosper) was rejected
when the participants realized that as many as 300,000 persons
could be thrown out of work by Chrysler’s liquidation. Mr. Rattner
has the audacity to claim that the politicians did not interfere in
the task force’s work, only a few pages after he describes how
White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel was able to recite from
memory the names of the members of Congress who represented
the districts where Chrysler had
manufacturing plants.

Had the President
simply announced
that the federal
government would
give $4 billion to
the UAW, the
public, even the
public in the
UAW’s home state
of Michigan,
would have been
up in arms.

Where is the evidence to support my hypothesis? Some comes
from the deviance of the process; most can be inferred from
Steven Rattner’s description of the political negotiation in the
administration and of the acts and thinking of the White House
automobile task force that Mr. Rattner directed. In an article
published in Fortune in October, Mr. Rattner (not to be confused
with Michigan Law’s own Steven Ratner) describes some of the

The surprising capitulation of the
secured creditors is also suspicious.
There is a strong argument that a
Section 363 sale cannot be made over
the objection of a secured creditor,
unless the creditor is paid not merely
the value of the collateral that secures
its debt (here no more than a few
billions and quite possibly less than
that) but the face amount of its debt
(here $6.9 billion). Because the secured
creditors agreed to the government’s
offer of $2 billion—or, more accurately,
because JPMorgan Chase & Co., the
agent for the secured creditors, was
found to have bound all of the secured
creditors by its agreement—no court
ever had to consider the argument that
Section 363 required payment of the
face amount of the secured debt. Mr.
Rattner proudly claims to have moved
Jimmy Lee, the Morgan banker who
spoke for the secured creditors, from a
claim for “not one penny less than $6.9
billion” to a $2 billion settlement by
adroit negotiation.

There is another possibility. Mr. Lee’s
employer and several of the other
secured creditors were TARP (Troubled
Asset Relief Program) recipients. It is plausible that Mr. Lee
accepted the $2 billion and chose not to argue for more in court
because word was passed to his boss, Jamie Dimon, that the
administration wanted it that way.
Understand what I am not claiming; I do not claim that the lawyers
or the judges in Chrysler did anything wrong. If they are aggrieved
it is only because they were the puppets attached to the
administration’s strings. By its clever but legal manipulation of the
bankruptcy system, the administration was able to move $4 billion
of value to its friend the UAW while being much less generous to
Chrysler’s secured creditors who, in another setting, could have
received a much larger payoff.
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The interesting issue in Chrysler is not the
lawyers’ manipulation of the law; it is the
politicians’ use of the bankruptcy to
launder money. Had the President simply announced that the
federal government would give $4 billion to the UAW, the public,
even the public in the UAW’s home state of Michigan, would have
been up in arms. By laundering the money through the Chapter 11
process, the administration disguised the payment and avoided
the outrage.
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